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COpBToinnoNs-Commuirry PROPERTY: NON-TAx ASPECTS OF THE
WASHINGTON PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION ACT.-Ch. 122,
Laws of 1969, now codified as RCW ch. 18.100 (1969).
The purpose of Washington's Professional Service Corporation Act
is to provide for the incorporation of an individual or group of in-
dividuals to render professional services.' Since organizations of pro-
fessional people under state professional corporation acts will be con-
sidered corporations for federal income tax purposes,2 this develop-
ment offers potential tax advantages to professional persons who
choose to incorporate their practices. However, the Washington statute
also raises certain non-tax issues that must be resolved by professional
persons seeking to incorporate. Since the tax issues have received
extensive and eminent treatment elsewhere,3 this Note will focus on
the less-discussed non-tax issues, and the scope of this Note is accord-
ingly limited to a discussion of: (1) the relationship between the Wash-
ington Business Corporation Act4 and the incorporation of a practice
by a sole practitioner, (2) the limitation of stockholders' liability for
claims against the professional corporation, and (3) the various pro-
visions of the act which restrict ownership of stock in a professional
corporation to individuals who are professionally qualified.5
1. Ch. 122, § 1, [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 367; WAsH Ray. CODE § 18.100.010 (1969).
2. In the light of recent decisions of the Federal courts, the [Internal Revenue]
Service generally will treat organizations of doctors, lawyers, and other professional
people organized under state professional association acts as corporations for tax
purposes.
Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970 INT. REv BuLL. No. 9, at 13. The Service has further indicated
that professional service organizations formed under certain designated state statutes will
be treated as corporations for tax purposes. Id. at 14-16. (The new Washington Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act is included in the list of approved statutes. Id. at 16.)
However, it is still possible that a professional service corporation will be disallowed
corporate tax treatment if it is not operated in fact as a corporation. In a recent Tax
Court case, it was ruled that where a professionally incorporated group of doctors did
not operate as a unit, except as to bookkeeping functions, the business was not carried
on by a corporation. Jerome J. Roubik, 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
3. For discussion of the income tax considerations relative to professional corporations
consult: Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead for Professional Corpora-
tions, 32 3. TAXATioN 88 (1970); O'Neill, Professional Corporations: Coping with the
Operational Problems, 31 J. TAxATIoN 94 (1969) ; Hall, Gissel, & Blackshear, Professional
Incorporation in Texas-A Current Look, 48 TEXs L. Rv. 85 (1969); C. BROSNAHAN,
ATToRmNy's GuIDE To CALIFORNIA PROxEssiOiAL CORpORATzoNs (1969) (an especially
helpful analysis of the situatfon in one jurisdiction).
4. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 23A (1965).
5. The first four sections of the act state its purpose and define the key words and
phrases used in the statute (WASr. REV. CODE §§ 18.100.010-.040 (1969)). Section 3
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1. Incorporation by a Sole Professional Practitioner
Under the terms of the Professional Service Corporation Act it
would appear that a sole practitioner can incorporate his practice6
without having to obtain other members of the profession to serve as
directors and officers of the corporation. The Washington Business
Corporation Act sets the minimum number of corporate directors at
three' and requires a minimum of two persons to hold the required
offices of a corporation.' However, the provisions of the Business
Corporation Act apply to a professional corporation only to the extent
that they are consistent with the terms of the Professional Service
Corporation Act. Where a conflict exists, the Professional Service
Corporation Act controls.
When called upon to interpret the Washington Professional Service
Corporation Act, the courts should conclude that in a professional
(WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.030) defines "professional services" as personal services
accorded to the public, the rendering of which requires a license or other legal authoriza-
tion and which could not legally be performed by a corporation prior to the passage of
the act. A "professional corporation" is a corporation organized under the act for the
purpose of rendering professional services.
Sections 3 (WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.030) and 6 (WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.060)
provide that all of the corporation's shareholders, directors, officers and employees must
be qualified to render the same professional service as the corporation. However, the
term "employees" does not include clerks, secretaries, bookkeepers, technicians, and
other assistants who are not customarily considered to be rendering professional services
for which a license is required.
Section 5 (WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.050) states that one or more registered architects
may join with one or more registered engineers to render their individual services through
a single corporation. This provision may aid in clarifying the seeming inconsistency that
appears in section 4 WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.040 which states that the act does not
apply to any person who prior to the passage of the act was permitted to perform per-
sonal services to the public through a corporation. However, the section further provides
that an existing corporation may become a professional corporation by amending its
articles of incorporation to make them consistent with the provisions of the act. There-
fore, since engineers were allowed to incorporate prior to the act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.41.130(8) (1967), a corporation of professional engineers may wish to join with
professional architects to perform services for the public through a professional corpora-
tion. Whether any other type of existing corporation would be allowed to come under
the act remains uncertain.
6. Section 5 (WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.050) of the act provides that:
An individual or group of individuals duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized
to render the same professional services within this state may organize and become a
shareholder or shareholders of a professional corporation for pecuniary profit under
the provisions of Title 23A RCW for the purpose of rendering professional service:
PROVIDED, That one or more of such legally authorized individuals shall be the
incorporators of such professional corporation. . . . (Emphasis added.)
However, it is uncertain whether a one-man corporation can achieve corporate tax
status. See Hall, Gissel & Blackshear, Professional Incorporation in Texas-A Current
Look, 48 TExAs L. REV. 84, 111 (1969).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.350 (1965).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.470 (1965).
9. Ch. 122, § 13 [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 371; WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.130 (1969).
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corporation the number of corporate directors and officers need not
exceed the number of shareholders. 10 The general intent of the Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act should take precedence over the
Business Corporation Act. Clearly, the Professional Service Corpora-
tion Act contemplates a corporation with only one shareholder since
the act refers to incorporation by only one shareholder in several of
its sections."
There is already some authority in support of this interpretation.
A recent memorandum of the Washington Attorney General's Office,
using an analysis similar to the foregoing, has advised the Washing-
ton Secretary of State's Office that it may accept papers of incorpora-
tion from professional service corporations having only one incor-
porator, even if he is also the only officer.' 2 Furthermore, in construing
a similar statute, the Oklahoma court in Christian v. Shideler5 found
that the legislative intent was to allow one or more individuals to in-
corporate and held that a professional corporation with only two share-
holders need have only two directors. And the Attorney General of
Florida has issued an opinion stating that the Florida Professional
Service Corporation Act should be interpreted to require no more
directors than incorporators.14
2. Limitation of Liability for Professional Service Corporation Stock-
holders
The shareholders of a professional service corporation have a limited
personal liability not enjoyed under the partnership form of associa-
10. The California statute specifically provides that a professional corporation with
only one shareholder need have only one director and the shareholder shall serve as the
president and treasurer of the corporation; the other officers need not be professionally
qualified. A professional corporation with only two shareholders need have only two
directors. CAL. CORP. CODE § 13403 (West Supp. 1969).
A similar statutory clarification was considered by the Washington legislature; the
proposed bill passed the House, but died in Senate committee. H. B. 3, 41st Leg. [1970J
Wash. 1st Ex. Sess.
11. Ch. 122, § 1, 3(2), 5 [1969J Wash. Sess. Laws 367; WASH. REV. CODE § 18.10.010,
.030(2), .050 (1969).
12. Memorandum opinion from Richard A. Heath, Assistant Washington Attorney
General, to Don MacKinnon, Office of the Washington Secretary of State, Oct. 29, 1969,
as reprinted in PROFESSIONAL SERWVCE CORPORATIONS 103-05 (Continuing Legal Education
in Washington: Reference Manual 1970).
13. 382 P.2d 129, 134 (Okla. 1963): "[T]o require the board of directors to have
three or more members would conflict with the intent of the legislature...."
14. [19613 FLA. Op. ArY. GEN. 061-109, as reported in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.01
(1961). See Buchman & Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business
Entity, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 8 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Buchman & Bearden].
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tion.' However, the limitation on personal liability is not as great
as that provided for in the Business Corporation Act 6 since the person
who renders professional services remains personally accountable to
the recipient of those services ".... for any negligent or wrongful acts
or misconduct committed by him or by any person under his direct
supervision and control .... 1 Furthermore, although the Act speaks
of personal liability only to the recipient of the professional services,
the professional person probably remains liable to third parties who
have been affected by the services rendered. That is to say, because
the Professional Service Corporation Act is not to be interpreted as
modifying or restricting the pre-existing law ". . . applicable to the
professional relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing
professional services and the person receiving such professional ser-
vices ... ,s the Act should not alter the professional person's normal
liability to third parties who are not the actual recipients of the
15. In a partnership all partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership tort
obligations, and are jointly liable for partnership contract obligations. WASH3. REV. CODE
§§ 25.04.130-.150 (1955).
16. Shareholders in a business corporation are under no obligation to the corporation
or its creditors except for unpaid obligations on share subscriptions. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 23A.08.210 (1965).
17. Section 7 (WAsH. REv. CODE § 18.100.070) of the act provides that:
Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, modify, re-
strict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the professional
relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the professional services and
the person receiving such professional service and the standards for professional
conduct. Any director, officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation
organized under this act shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable
for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him or by any
person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering professional services
on behalf of the corporation to the person for whom such professional services
were being rendered. The corporation shall be liable for any negligent or wrongful
acts of misconduct committed by any of its directors, officers, shareholders, agents
or employees while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation, in the rendering
of professional services.
Note, a person remains personally liable for the professional services that he renders and,
in addition, for professional services rendered by any one under his "direct supervision
and control." Because the statute offers no guidelines, the meaning of "direct super-
vision and control" remains uncertain.
However, "direct supervision and control" seems more limited in scope than a mere
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The word "direct" implies actual
direction and coordination of the employee's work. Apparently the person is not re-
sponsible for the conduct of all employees of the corporation. If the legislature had
intended such a meaning, they could have stated it more clearly. "Direct supervision
and control" probably means that the individual personally directs the rendering of the
services, decides who shall receive the services, and determines the degree and amount
of services to be rendered. Cf. Industrial Commission v. Navajo County, 64 Ariz. 172,
167 P.2d 113, 118 (1946).
18. Ch. 122, § 7, [19691 Wash. Sess. Laws 369; WASH. REv. CODE § 18.100.070 (1969).
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services. 9 The impact of the limited personal liability that accom-
panies incorporation is reduced even further yet since the Act makes
the corporation liable for misconduct committed by any of its direc-
tors, officers, shareholders, agents or employees in the rendering of
professional services.2 ° The shareholders in the professional corpora-
tion will thus be vulnerable to the extent of their equity in the cor-
poration for any such claims against the corporation. 1
On the other hand, because the Professional Service Corporation
Act only provides for personal liability arising out of the rendition
of professional services, the liability for other activities of the corpora-
tion should follow general corporation law. Therefore, the stockhold-
ers would not be personally liable to general business creditors of
the corporation.22 Nor would the stockholders be personally liable for
claims arising out of the investment of corporate funds.28 Thus, the
professional corporation form of association does at least have the
advantage of limiting the liability of the shareholders for general busi-
ness debts of the corporation and for activities not associated with
the rendering of professional services, and further insulation is pro-
vided by the restriction of liability for acts of others to those com-
mitted under "direct supervision and control."24
19. For example, under some circumstances a person rendering professional services
may be liable to a third party with whom there was no privity of contract. For a
discussion of liability to persons other than the testator for drawing an invalid will,
see Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1363 (1959). For a discussion of accountants' liability to third
parties, see Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Pro-
tection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WAsH. L. Rav. 139 (1968); and Annot., 54
AL.R.2d 324 (1957).
20. The act retains the principle that a corporation is liable for wrongful acts
committed by its officers, employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment
under the rule of respondeat superior. Ch. 122, § 7 [19691 Wash. Sess. Laws 369; WAsH.
REv. CODE § 18.100.070 (1969). The corporation and the employee who committed the
wrongful act are jointly liable to the injured person. See Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1057 (1935).
21. However, the professional corporation may wish to carry malpractice insurance
on all of its personnel and on itself to eliminate this vulnerability.
Interestingly, in California and Colorado, conventional corporate stockholders' limited
liability is allowed so long as the professional corporation maintains a sufficient amount
of professional liability insurance. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1808 (dentists), § 2508
(doctors), and § 6171 (lawyers) (West 1968); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 2656 (1965).
22. See Buchman & Bearden, supra note 14, at 12.
23. A professional corporation cannot engage in any business other than rendering
the professional services for which it was organized, but may make any type of
investments, ch. 122, § 8 [1969] Wash. Sess. Lews 369; WAsH. REV. CODE § 18.100.080
(1969). Thus situations will arise where courts are called upon to distinguish between
engaging in a business and making investments. See Buchman & Bearden, supra note 14,
at 9.
24. See notes 16 & 17 supra. See also Buchman & Bearden, supra note 14, at 12.
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3. Restriction of Stock Ownership to Professionally Qualified
Individuals
The ownership of shares in a professional corporation is restricted
to individuals who are legally authorized to render the professional
services, and a shareholder may sell or transfer his stock only to an
individual who is eligible to be a shareholder, i.e., professionally
qualified." These restrictions on ownership could conceivably be vio-
lated in certain situations by a spouse's community interest in a share-
holder's professional corporation stock.
If a husband owns shares in a professional corporation, his wife
probably has a one-half interest in those shares as her part of the
community property. 6 If she is not professionally qualified, there
could conceivably be a violation of the terms of the statute, for the
Washington Supreme Court has generally ruled that a spouse's com-
munity property interest is a present undivided one-half ownership in
the community assets.17 The husband and wife could make an agree-
ment that the stock is the husband's separate property,2 thereby elim-
inating the wife's ownership interest. However, a wife may be reluctant
to make such an agreement, especially when the professional corpora-
tion stock may be the major asset of the marital community. The
court, when faced with the problem of a wife's community property
interest in professional corporation stock, should conclude that the
Professional Service Corporation Act did not intend that such an
interest bar the husband from owning stock in a professional cor-
poration. The ownership restrictions seem to represent a policy re-
stricting the class of persons who can exercise shareholder rights in a
professional corporation. In essence, "ownership" as used in the
statute probably means management control. When the husband is
25. Ch. 122, § 9 [19691 Wash. Sess. Laws 370, WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.090 (1969).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958).
27. In Re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938); In Re Haringer's
Estate, 38 Wn. 2d 399, 230 P.2d 297 (1951).
28. Burch v. Rice, 37 Wn. 2d 185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950); In Re Garrity's Estate,
22 Wn. 2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945).
29. The act prohibits a voting trust agreement or any other type of agreement
whereby a person other than the shareholder is authorized to exercise the voting power
of his stock, ch. 122, § 9 [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 370; WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.090
(1969). This suggests that the ownership restrictions are designed to prevent a person
who is not professionally qualified from having an influence over the affairs of the
corporation. Therefore, interpreting the ownership restrictions on the act to apply only to
the stockholder of record is an unsatisfactory solution.
832
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the manager of the community assets, the wife's interest in the stock
does not give her the right to exercise the voting power of the stock. °
Therefore, when it is the husband who is professionally qualified, the
Professional Service Corporation Act can be reconciled harmoniously
with the community property aspects of ownership in the stock.
However, this rationale is not satisfactory when the wife is pro-
fessionally qualified and the husband is not. Since the husband is
typically the manager of the community assets under the community
property law of Washington, 3 he would control the voting rights to
the extent that her professional corporation stock was community
property. If he were allowed to exercise this control, the intent of
the act would clearly be violated. If the husband and wife considered
a separate property agreement to be unsatisfactory," the husband
should be denied the power to manage the stock of the professional
corporation. A basis for this denial might be that by allowing his
wife to join or continue in a professional corporation he has consented
to her control of the professional corporation stock as required by the
statute.33
30. Generally, the husband has the right to manage and control the community
personal property. WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958).
31. WAsH. RFV. CODE §§ 26.16.030, 26.16.040 (1958).
32. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
33. See Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wn. 2d. 266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957); Bowers
v. Good, 52 Wash. 384, 100 P. 848 (1909). This rationale could also be used to deny
the wife's authority to exercise the voting power of her husband's professional corporation
stock in situations where the wife has the power to manage the community assets. In
Washington, the wife may exercise management powers over community assets in certain
circumstances, e.g., when necessary to preserve the value of the community assets and
the husband is not available. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 P. 111 (1916).
The foregoing analysis preserves the status of the shares as community property. When
the spouse who is professionally qualified is the first to die, distribution of the proceeds
of the redemption discussed below prevents no novel problems. Absent an agreement
between the spouses, when the non-qualified spouse is the first to die, however, the
problem is not so easily resolved. The whole of the community property is subject to
administration, and one-half of that property is subject to testamentary disposition by
the decedent. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.02.070 (1969). Washington apparently follows an
item theory of division, which allows the decedent, if he so chooses, to dispose of his
one-half interest in each community asset. In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wn. 2d 179, 373 P.2d
125 (1962); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937). This
would allow the non-qualified decedent to dispose of one-half of the shares. Under an
aggregate theory of division, the decedent's testamentary power would extend to one-half
the value of the total community property, and could be satisfied by liquidating one-half
of the total community assets. Even under this method of division, some of the shares
might be subject to the decedent spouse's power were there not enough other community
property to set off against the shares. Consequently, the corporation should provide
for redemption of all shares upon the death of either spouse and provide the surviving
qualified spouse a right to repurchase.
833
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On stock ownership restrictions generally, the articles of incorpora-
tion must require that ".... each shareholder in the corporation pro-
vide for redemption or cancellation of all shares which are transferred
to any person or entity ineligible to be a shareholder, whether such
transfer be voluntary, involuntary, or by operation of law."34 Similarly,
when a shareholder becomes legally disqualified to render professional
services he must sever "all employment with, and financial interests
in" (emphasis added) the corporation, and the corporation's failure
to require compliance with this provision constitutes grounds for dis-
solution." Thus, when a shareholder dies, or becomes legally dis-
qualified, or when his creditors acquire his shares, the corporation
may experience difficulty since the act does not provide for a time
period during which the corporation can acquire the funds necessary
to liquidate the shareholder's interest in the corporation.
In designing the terms under which stock will be issued, the drafts-
man probably need not be concerned with liquidation in the situation
where the corporation is insolvent or such liquidation would render the
corporation insolvent, since the provisions of the Business Corporation
Act which forbid purchase of its shares by the corporation in these
situations36 would not appear to be abrogated by the Professional
Service Corporation Act. Similarly, provisions forbidding redemption
or purchase of redeemable shares when the corporation is insolvent
or when such redemption would render it insolvent 37 appear to remain
intact. There is simply no reason to believe that the shareholders (and
their creditors) should be preferred over creditors of the corporation.
The draftsman must decide how to redeem the shareholder's interest
in a solvent corporation, however, and avoiding unnecessary disrup-
tion certainly will be desirable. If difficulty in immediate redemption
of shares is foreseeable, cancellation of the shares and replacement
with a debt obligation would seem to be available when the shareholder
34. Ch. 122, § 11, [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 370; WASr. REV. CODE § 18.100.110
(1969).
35. Ch. 122, § 10, [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 370; WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.100
(1969).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 (1965).
It should be noted that in Washington's Business Corporation Act "insolvency" is
defined in the equitable sense, viz. ..... inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of its business." WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(14) (1965).
37. WASH. REV Code § 23A.16.090 (1965).
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dies. The stock ownership restrictions do not preclude this technique,
and the policies of the Act would not seem to be violated by it.8
However, despite the terms of the statute allowing cancellation
when shares are transferred involuntarily or by operation of law, 9 a
corporation perhaps will not be able to simply cancel shares acquired
by the personal creditors of the shareholder. In Street v. Sugarman4
the Florida court held that the stock of a professional corporation was
subject to levy and sale, under execution, by a non-professional credi-
tor of a shareholder, notwithstanding the Florida statute's prohibition
of transfers of shares to non-qualified persons.4' To allow shareholders
to shelter their assets from their creditors was found to be inconsistent
with the act, and to give shareholders in a professional corporation a
privilege not available to shareholders in an ordinary business corpora-
tion. More importantly, the Street court felt that transfer to a non-
qualifying creditor should trigger the dissolution provisions of the
act, even though the Florida Act, like the Washington Act, provides
for dissolution only if a legally disqualified shareholder fails to sever
his interest in the corporation." The conclusion, then, is that personal
creditors of a shareholder not only have access to his shares, but also
must be able to realize the shareholder's real interest in the corporation.
Therefore, when personal creditors of a shareholder acquire his
shares, cancellation of the shares is probably not available. Also, in
38. The ownership restrictions do not prevent a person who is not professionally
qualified from having a financial interest in the corporation as one of its creditors
provided the person does not own any stock of the professional corporation. The owner-
ship restrictions of the act rather seem designed to prevent a non-professional from having
an influence in corporation decisions by exercising the voting rights of corporation stock.
See note 29 supra.
39. See note 34 and accompanying text supr.
40. 202 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1967).
41. The court based its holding partially on the reasoning that although the statute
prevented the voluntary sale of the stock by a shareholder, it did not prevent the
execution and sale by law for a judgment creditor. The Florida act only provides that
"No shareholder... may sell or transfer his shares ... except to another individual who
is eligible to be a shareholder. . . ." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.01 (1969). However, under
the terms of the Washington act the articles of incorporation must require the share-
holders to provide for "redemption or cancellation of all shares which are transferred to
any person or entity ineligible to be a shareholder, whether such transfer be voluntary,
involuntary, or by operation of 1aw." (Emphasis added.) Ch. 122, § 11, [1969] Wash.
Sess. Laws 370; WASH3. RaV CODE § 18.100.110 (1969).
42. The provisions for dissolution of the corporation in the Florida statute are
basically the same as the provisions in the Washington act. The Florida provisions are
in FLA. STAT. Am. § 621.10 (1969). The Washington provisions are in ch. 122, § 10
[1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 370; WASH. Rv. CODE § 18.100.100 (1969).
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the event a shareholder becomes legally disqualified to render profes-
sional services, cancellation of shares probably is not desirable, and
replacement of the shares with a debt obligation does not appear to
be available because the act requires the shareholder to immediately
sever all financial interest in the corporation.4 3 Thus, a corporation
without sufficient funds on hand to liquidate the interest of these
shareholders may be subject to dissolution, a result that both credi-
tors and shareholders may find objectionable. This result can be
avoided in either of two ways.
When faced with the task of severing a shareholder's interest in a
solvent professional corporation, a court could consider the shares
cancelled or redeemed presently, while interpreting the provisions
requiring severance of financial interests to require payment for the
shares within a reasonable time. 4 This interpretation would allow
the corporation a reasonable time to acquire funds to liquidate the
shareholder's interest, and yet assure that no non-qualified persons
could exercise shareholder rights.
43. Ch. 122, § 11 [1969] Wash. Sess. Laws 370; WASH. REV. CODE § 18.100.110
(1969).
44. The situation in which the corporation is solvent but does not have the funds
necessary to redeem the shares is analagous to the situation in which the corporation
is insolvent. When the corporation is insolvent, it cannot legally use funds to redeem
the shares. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra. It is not unreasonable to
suggest that the shares of an insolvent corporation could be considered redeemed, while
the right to payment remains subordinate to the claims of the corporation's creditors.
If there is likelihood that the corporation will become solvent, all the creditors would
probably find this preferable to dissolution. The effect then would be to require payment
for the shareholder's interest if and when the corporation legally could pay. "Where the
company . . . cannot raise immediately the money needed to retire the stock without
jeopardizing creditors, the court will decree that it take proper means to accomplish the
redemption of the stock." Mueller v. Kraeuter & Co., 131 N.J. Eq. 475, 25 A.2d 874,
874-75 (1942) (Syllabus by the court). Accord, Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, 176
Ky. 188, 195 S.W. 477 (1917).
Similarly, were the professional corporation unable to muster the funds required to
redeem the shareholder's equity, the shares could be considered redeemed, thus avoiding
the ownership restrictions imposed in the act, and precluding detriment to the corpora-
tion's creditors. The public's interest is reflected in the provision disallowing disqualified
professionals from maintaining a financial interest in the corporation. The provision
appears to be an attempt to assure that the disqualified professional will not participate
in any of the affairs of the corporation, and recgonizes that participation would be likely
as a result of the disqualified professional's familiarity with the corporation and its
officials were a financial interest to continue. However, the court would be able to protect
the public's interest with a decree forbidding such conduct, and through its approval of
the transactions take steps to accomplish redemption of the stock .
For a discussion of when shareholders who exercise their rights of redemption become
creditors of the corporation see Note, Stock Redemption at the Option of the Share-
holder in the Close Corporation, 48 IowA L. Rav. 986, 992 (1963).
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The second solution is more certain. Under the terms of the Cali-
fornia Professional Corporation Act, the corporation has a ninety day
period to redeem the stock of a shareholder who becomes disqualified
from rendering professional services, and a six month period to redeem
the stock of a shareholder who dies.4 5 Such a provision is beneficial to
the corporation and its shareholders, and to the creditors of the cor-
poration as well, since the corporation is able to continue functioning
within the ownership restrictions with a minimum disruption of its
affairs. The Washington legislature should consider an amendment to
incorporate a similar provision in the Washington Professional Ser-
vice Corporation Act.
Although the tax considerations of the new state professional cor-
poration acts have received the predominant attention, there are non-
tax considerations, as the preceding discussion has shown, which are
of equal perplexity and importance and which will require the atten-
tion of professional persons desiring to incorporate.*
45. CAL. CoaP. CoDE § 13407 (West Supp. 1969).
* The Board of Editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance received in the
final editorial revision of this Note from Mr. Richard Dodd, 3rd year student, University
of Washington School of Law.
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